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Abstract
The German apprenticeship system is often considered a role model for
vocational education. Its inuence on economic growth and technological
progress through the provision of human capital to the workforce is widely
acknowledged. But recent declines in the number of apprenticeships have led
to increasing unrest among policy makers. To counter this development, the
government is considering to introduce a training levy scheme that collects
training levies from non-training rms in order to subsidize apprenticeship
training (Ausbildungsplatzabgabe). Such training levy schemes already ex-
ist in several industrialized countries and even in some sectors in Germany.
Yet, economists di¤er greatly in opinion about this policy. More surprisingly,
however, a general economic analysis of this policy instrument is still lacking.
Recent contributions have relied on rather qualitative and partial analyses.
This paper aims at closing this gap. Following the training literature, we use
a simple oligopsonistic labor market model. Such a setting allows to explain
why rms provide and (at least partially) nance general vocational train-
ing. Moreover, it can demonstrate that a positive externality arises as other
rms benet from vocational training through poaching. In principle, the
Pigouvian prescription of a subsidy scheme nanced by a non-distortionary
tax could restore the social optimum. The proposed training levy scheme, by
contrast, is a particular scheme that links subsidies and levies. This paper
unveils that it basically corresponds to a uniform subsidy on apprenticeship
training that is nanced by a distortionary tax on labor. We show that in-
troducing such a levy scheme can entail ambiguous repercussions on general
welfare.
JEL classication: H23, I22, I28, J24
Keywords: Vocational Training, Frictional Labor Markets, Poaching, Levy-
Grant-Scheme, Training levy
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Zusammenfassung
Das duale Ausbildungssystem in Deutschland gilt vielen Ländern als Vor-
bild für die beruiche Bildung. Es dient einem großen Teil der Bevölkerung
zum Aufbau von Humankapital. Der Einuss auf Wirtschaftswachstum und
technischen Fortschritt ist weithin anerkannt. Der beobachtbare Rückgang
der Ausbildungsplätze und Ausbildungsbereitschaft gibt jedoch zunehmend
Anlass zur Beunruhigung. Um dieser Entwicklung entgegenzuwirken, beste-
hen seit längerem Überlegungen für die Einführung einer Ausbildungsplatz-
abgabe. Sie soll einen nanziellen Ausgleich für Ausbildungsunternehmen
scha¤en und zugleich Nicht-Ausbildungsunternehmen zu eigener Ausbildung
ermuntern. Anreizsysteme für betriebliche Bildung bestehen bereits in einer
Reihe anderer Industriestaaten und sogar in einigen Sektoren in Deutschland.
Unter Ökonomen ist das Vorhaben einer Ausbildungsplatzabgabe jedoch um-
stritten. Überraschenderweise besteht jedoch keine allgemeine Analyse dieses
Politikvorschlags. Bestehende Analysen sind eher qualitativ und partialana-
lytisch. Dieser Beitrag versucht diese Lücke zu schließen. Im Anschluss an die
jüngere Humankapitalliteratur wird hier ein einfaches Modell betrieblicher
Ausbildung in friktionellen Arbeitsmärkten vorschlagen. In einem solchen
Rahmen werden Unternehmen allgemeine Ausbildung bereitstellen und zu-
mindest partiell nanzieren. Zugleich lässt sich ein positiver externer Ef-
fekt aufzeigen, der aufgrund von Abwerbung (Poaching) von ausgebildeten
Mitarbeitern entsteht. Grundsätzlich könnte eine ideale Pigou-Subvention
das soziale Optimum wiederherstellen. Dagegen stellt die vorgeschlagene
Ausbildungsabgabe ein bestimmtes Steuer-Subventions-Verfahren dar. Mit
diesem Instrument erfährt Ausbildung eine Einheitssubvention, während ak-
tuelle Beschäftigung besteuert wird. Es kann gezeigt werden, dass ungeachtet
des positiven externen E¤ekts die Einführung einer Ausbildungsplatzabgabe
nicht zwingend wohlfahrtssteigernd ist.
JEL Klassizierung: H23, I22, I28, J24
Stichworte: Beruiche Bildung, Arbeitsmarktfriktionen, Abwerbung, Steuer-
Subventions-Verfahren, Ausbildungsplatzabgabe
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1 Introduction
The German apprenticeship system is often considered a role model for vo-
cational education. It provides basic vocational training to a large share of
the workforce. Roughly two thirds of the age-group from 15 to 24 attend vo-
cational education through the apprenticeship system. Apprenticeship train-
ing is well-structured and leads to a certied qualication widely recognized
among employers. Moreover, the system is renowned for its duality of simul-
taneous schooling and training on-the-job. For several years, however, the
number of registered apprenticeships has declined and unemployment among
the youth has risen simultaneously.1 Considering that general unemployment
is already high in general, this development increasingly raises concerns and
provokes doubts about the apprenticeship system in general. It is questioned
whether this decline is of cyclical and thus only transitional nature or, to
the contrary, results from insu¢ cient returns to training due to poaching of
trained apprentices by other rms. The fact that the proportion of rms that
actually provide training is small in absolute terms, is taken as an indication
for the latter.2
Given the importance of the apprenticeship system for the provision of
human capital and thus for economic growth and technological progress,
remedies are eagerly sought. Government is considering to introduce a sys-
tem that subsidizes apprenticeship training and collects training levies from
non-training rms. Such training levy schemes already exist in several indus-
trialized countries for vocational training and sometimes also for continuous
training.3 Economists di¤er greatly in opinion about this policy proposal.
1The number of registered apprenticeships has declined from 1,629,312 in 1991 to
1,581,629 in 2003. Since the peak in 2000 at 1,702,017 this is a decline of 7%. Sim-
ilarly, the number of new apprenticeship contracts decreased in the same period from
571,206 to 564,493 peaking in 1999 with 635,559 (BMBF 2004, 9).
2In 2002, only 31.3% of all rms were actually providing apprenticeship training (BMBF
2004, 102).
3In Germany, such transfer systems have been introduced through collective agreements
in the construction and chemical industry, but attempts for legislation at the federal
level have failed so far. France is already using such schemes to fund training as well as
continuous training. For an international overview of training schemes see in particular
Gasskov (1994).
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Some agree with the idea that it would internalize positive training spillovers
and thereby provide additional incentives for training. Others accept that
due to poaching, private and social returns from training diverge, but con-
sider the instrument to be overly bureaucratic and not in accordance with
the institutional order of a market economy. Still others question the exis-
tence of an externality arising from training altogether and therefore see little
need for this economic policy. But given the importance of the question, it
seems surprising that a theoretical analysis of this policy instrument is still
lacking.4
This paper aims at closing this gap. First of all we will ask whether poach-
ing indeed gives rise to a positive externality leading to an under-provision
of apprenticeship training. We will then investigate whether the introduc-
tion of a levy-grant-system for vocational education would theoretically be a
welfare-improving policy.
Following the recent training literature, we study a simple oligopsonistic
labor market model. Such a setting allows to explain why rms provide and
also nance (at least partially) general vocational training. At the same time,
however, we can show that a positive externality from training exists as other
rms benet from poaching. In a subsequent policy analysis we can then
demonstrate that in principle the Pigouvian prescription of an ideal subsidy
scheme nanced by a non-distortionary tax could restore the social optimum.
A levy-grant-scheme, by contrast, is a particular scheme where subsidies and
levies are interlinked. This paper unveils that it is equivalent to a uniform
subsidy on apprenticeship training that is nanced by a distortionary tax on
labor. We show that introducing such a levy-grant-scheme is theoretically
ambiguous to welfare even when informational and administrative costs are
absent.
We will proceed as follows: In the next section we review the state of
the literature on vocational training and positive spillovers. In accordance
4For an overview of the policy debate see, for example, the di¤ering contributions in
the special issue of ifo Schnelldienst, Vol. 57, No. 6. See Franz (1983) for a study on an
earlier policy proposal for a levy-grant-scheme for vocational training in Germany. His
analysis is however only partial and does not address the question of an externality.
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with recent research we will then introduce a simple model of apprenticeship
training. Based on this model we will thereafter study incentives schemes for
training. We will conclude with an overview of our ndings and draw some
policy recommendations for vocational training.
2 Vocational Education and Positive Spillovers
Positive spillovers in vocational education have long ago attracted the in-
terest of economists. Early contributions hinted at the problem of positive
externalities accruing to society and proposed policy measures to improve
welfare. Later contributions, quite to the contrary, questioned the existence
of such positive spillovers and o¤ered completely di¤erent policy conclusions.
In light of these opposing views, a short review of the literature on vocational
education and positive spillovers seems strongly mandated.5
2.1 Precursors and Initial Theoretic Approaches
Already classical economists noted the existence of educational spillovers.
In his renowned contribution, Smith (1776) refers to the positive value of
education for society in general. He sees in education not only a means
of skill acquisition but also benets for law, order and culture. Because of
these benecial social e¤ects, he derives a role for the state in providing basic
education and suggests partial public contributions (Smith 1776, 990).
While Smiths analysis was concerned with education in general and with
incentives for instructors in particular, later writers dealt more specically
with the vocational training of the workforce by employing rms. Marshall
(1920) distinguished between basic education and technical education. He
considered basic education to be a public duty, but vocational training an
employer obligation (Marshall 1920, IV, vi). Firms were seen to rst and
foremost benet from the resulting gains in labor productivity. Therefore,
they should also have an inherent self-interest to o¤er vocational training.
5For an extended overview on the history of educational economics see, for instance,
Pfahler (2000).
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Yet, in light of the industrial revolution, economists increasingly observed
a lack of technical education. On the one hand, universal apprenticeship
training declined as machines and assembly lines replaced manual techniques
and pushed traditional trades and crafts aside. On the other hand, the
expanding industrial sector o¤ered only little on-the-job training. Industrial
workers were left to execute simple and repeatable tasks, despite striking
opportunities to enlarge their skills and qualications (Smits & Stromback
2001).
Pigou (1912) is acknowledged for the rst economic analysis of on-the-job
training. He emphasized that a training rmmay be inhibited from obtaining
the full returns to its training e¤orts because, with some workers quitting for
another rm, the new employer also participates in the returns to training.
Thereby he identied poaching as the source of the discrepancy between
private and social returns to training. The following quotation illustrates
this idea.
It is, however, obvious that openings exist for investments
by the tenant (i.e. the employer) in workpeoples capacity, which
would yield considerable social net product. Under a slave econ-
omy, since the employer could secure for himself the whole result
of increased e¢ ciency in his workpeople and their families, the
whole of the social net product of any unit of resources invested in
the improvement of their quality would be represented in private
net product. Under a free economy, however, since workpeople
are liable to change employers, and so to deprive investing ten-
ants of the fruits of their investment, the private net product is
apt to fall considerably short of the social net product. Hence, so-
cially protable expenditure by employers in the training of their
workpeople, in building up their health, and in defending them
against accident does not carry a corresponding private prot.
(Pigou 1912, 153)
Pigou observed that this positive spillover from training is lost to the
investing rm, but not to society as a whole. From a social point of view,
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therefore, training will be undersupplied because private investment is only
carried out up to the point where additional private returns equal the ad-
ditional costs. With the extra social returns not taken into account by the
training rm, welfare falls short of its optimal level.
Following this assessment of the economic situation, Pigou indentied
a possible role for the state to improve overall welfare. He proposed to
introduce scal incentives (or disincentives) to private activities that bring
about additional returns (or costs) to society. With such a policy, the social
externalities caused by an action can be attributed to an individual decision
and will thereby lead to a true economic calculation. Modern economists now
commonly refer to this policy instrument as Pigouvian subsidyor Pigouvian
tax.
It is plain that divergences between private and social net
product of the kind just considered cannot [...] be mitigated by
a modication of the contractual relation between any two con-
tracting parties, because the divergence arises out of a service or
disservice rendered to persons other than the contracting parties.
It is, however, possible for the State, if it so chooses, to remove the
divergence in any eld by extraordinary encouragementsor ex-
traordinary restraintsupon investments in that eld. The most
obvious forms, which these encouragements and restraints may
assume, are, of course, those of bounties and taxes.(Pigou 1912,
164)
While a Pigouvian tax deliberately discourages the taxed activity and
brings about some revenues, a Pigouvian subsidy, by contrast, requires addi-
tional nancial resources in order to encourage socially benecial activities.
Public funds are however scarce. Thus, in case subsidies are introduced, ei-
ther alternative public spending is to be discarded or additional funds must
be collected. Pigou noted that raising tax revenue inicts costs on society.
Therefore, in case subsidies are introduced to encourage activities benecial
to social welfare, their benets are to exceed their nancial costs.
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The raising of an additional £ of revenue ... inicts indirect
damage on the taxpayers as a body over and above the loss they
su¤er in actual money payment. Where there is indirect damage,
it ought to be added to the direct loss of satisfaction involved
in the withdrawal of the marginal unit of resources by taxation,
before this is balanced against the satisfaction yielded by the
marginal expenditure.(Pigou 1947, 33-34)
Economists widely accepted Pigous conjecture of a poaching externality
in vocational education. Not surprisingly, subsequent public policy towards
vocational education supported a stronger public inuence and proposed sub-
sidies for worker training. In fact, several countries introduced nancial in-
centives to vocational training.6 However, Pigous assessment of training as
well as the role of public policy therein did not remain unchallenged.
2.2 Human Capital Theory
The emergence of human capital theory gave rise to a major revision to
the economics of training. This literature drew attention to the shortcom-
ings of neoclassical economics and criticized in particular the prevailing as-
sumption of homogeneous labor. It pointed out that the growth in per
capita incomes across countries cannot be explained by using a standard
production function approach with stocks of land and capital and the size
of the workforce. Therefore, early propopents of human capital theory (e.g.
Schultz 1961, Becker 1962, Mincer 1974) urged to reconsider the representa-
tion of people in economic models. They emphasized to account for work-
ersskills and knowledge as key determinants of economic performance. In
contrast to neoclassical economics, human capital theory endorsed a more
general concept of capital that allowed in particular for human resources.
6The British Training Act of 1972 is exemplary for revisions of training policy to eco-
nomic knowledge. Aiming to overcome market failure in training, it introduced levy-grant
schemes for apprenticeship training at the sector level. These schemes operated until 1982
but were then abandoned in favor of more market-oriented solutions. See in particular
Stevens (1999) for an account of vocational training policy in Britain.
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In analogy to physical or nancial capital, human capital is perceived as
the stock of knowledge, skills, health, or abilities that is embodied in a per-
son and that can be put to productive work. Moreover, human capital can
be increased, alike investments in physical or nancial capital, by training,
schooling or health provisions (Becker 1962, 11).
In a pioneering contribution, Becker (1962) analyzes incentives for human
capital investments and the emergence of positive spillovers. In particular,
he focuses on motives for on-the-job training. In contrast to school training,
on-the-job training is carried out at the workplace and through the rm. It
raises the productivity of the workforce in the future, but involves costs to
the training rm at present, such as time, e¤ort, material, and equipment.
Becker points out that resources spent for on-the-job training compete with
alternative investment opportunities. By consequence, a rm incurring ad-
ditional costs or lower revenues from training necessarily expects su¢ ciently
larger revenues or fewer expenditures in the future.
Becker distinguishes between general and specic training. General train-
ing raises the workers marginal product in all rms, regardless whether the
worker remains with the rm or quits for another employer. Specic training,
by contrast, gives rise to an increase in the marginal product of labor only
in the training rm.
General training is equally valuable to all rms. This forces the train-
ing rm to pay workers the market wage. Otherwise, the worker could use
the general skills and quit for another rm to obtain the prevailing market
wage. If labor markets are competitive, the market wage equals the mar-
ginal product of labor. This implies that rms cannot draw any returns from
training workers. All returns from the human capital investment are reected
in the higher wage and accrue fully to the worker. Receiving the full bene-
ts, however, the worker has proper incentives to bear the investment costs.
Becker concludes that rms might provide general training, but workers will
e¤ectively pay for it, either directly or indirectly via wage reductions in the
investment period. Moreover, as all returns accrue to the worker, there are
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no spillovers from general training onto other rms. Thus, contrary to Pigou,
training is e¢ cient (Becker 1962, 17).
For specic training, Becker argues that rms will be able to recover train-
ing costs. Because these skills are of no use to other rms, the competitive
market wage remains una¤ected. The training rm will thus capture all re-
turns from specic training through the increase in worker productivity. But
since this investment is rewarding only as long as the worker stays with the
rm, some of the returns from this investment will be shared between the
rm and the worker in order to prevent workers from quitting. Yet again, as
all returns are collected by the private parties there is no spillover to other
rms by this type of investment (Becker 1962, 21).
In sum, standard human capital theory negates positive spillovers from
vocational training. As private and social returns do not diverge, human capi-
tal investment will be at its socially optimal level. General training is paid for
by the worker, specic training by both the employer and the worker. Becker
acknowledges that insu¢ cient general training may indeed arise if workers
are exposed to credit constraints and/or are risk averse (Becker 1962, 41f.).
In this case, however, training subsidies or public training provision are not
warranted. Rather, educational policy should address the problems prevail-
ing in credit and insurance markets that cause these training limitations.
2.3 Human Capital Investments and Imperfect Com-
petition
Despite its theoretical appeal, standard human capital theory faces profound
shortcomings. Firstly, it is (at least partially) contradicted by empirical
evidence. In contrast to its central proposition, a large number of empiri-
cal studies conrm the existence of rm-provided and rm-nanced general
training. In fact, even despite the risk of quits, rms seem to incur sub-
stantial training costs to provide general skills to their workforce. Acemoglu
& Pischke (1998) display various evidence for rm-nanced general training.
Several studies also document net training costs for apprenticeship training in
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Germany. Harho¤ & Kane (1997) estimate training costs by sector and rm
size. The gross costs of apprenticeship training across sectors are displayed
at $17,645 per apprentice and year with on average higher costs in larger
rms and industrial sectors. Even after taking the apprentices productivity
into account, net costs to rms remain high at $10,657 per apprentice and
year, or 60% of the gross costs.7
Secondly, human capital theory is unable to explain some common fea-
tures of apprenticeship training, such as the xed duration of training con-
tracts or the restrictions on unilateral termination. Under the assumption
of competitive labor markets with full information and perfect contracting,
these particularities should be superuous (Smits & Stromback 2001, 32).
The contradictions between human capital theory and empirical evidence
have ignited new interest in the economics of training. Several recent publica-
tions investigate the economic rationales behind rm-nanced general train-
ing. They explicitly consider imperfect competition. Even though Becker
already noted the role of labor market conditions, he left oligopsonistic labor
markets unconsidered and regarded the dichotomy of general and specic
skills a useful simplication. Recent contributions question the assumption
of a perfect labor market for general skills altogether and analyze training
technology and labor market conditions separately.8 In order to explain
rm-nanced general training these studies commonly feature labor market
imperfections that give rise to a compressed wage structure. In such a set-
ting, rms can extract a rent from employing skilled workers, as the market
wage is below the marginal product of labor. General training increases the
marginal product of labor. Because of the compressed wage structure, how-
ever, wages increase to a lesser degree. This turns technologically general
skills into de facto rm-specic skills. Contrary to standard human capital
theory it is therefore protable for a rm to nance general training. In the
optimum, a rm will provide a training level where the marginal increase in
7For detailed studies assessing the cost of apprenticeship training in Germany see in
particular Bardeleben, Beicht & Fehér (1995) and Winkelmann (1997).
8See in particular Acemoglu & Pischke (1998) for a basic overview and survey of the
literature.
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the rent is equal to the marginal cost of training.
The literature has identied several mechanisms causing a compressed
wage structure. They relate to production technology, market competition
as well as informational and institutional conditions.
For instance, a compressed wage structure could result from technological
complementarities. Capital and labor input may be complements. Such com-
plementarities in the production technology increase the marginal product of
labor. The value of a trained worker is therefore higher to the training rm
than to outside rms (Acemoglu & Pischke 1998, 559). Complementarities
may also arise in the training process when simultaneously instructing gen-
eral and rm-specic skills is complementary (Franz & Soskice 1995, 219f.).
Competitive conditions on the output market could also account for wage
compression. Hentschirsch (1999) analyzes training investments for product
markets that are characterized by Cournot or Bertrand competition. Simi-
larly, Gersbach & Schmutzler (2003) use a game-theoretic structure to show
that rms will provide training when competition on the nal market is suf-
ciently soft.
Another source of wage compression may be informational asymmetries.
In a pioneering contribution, Katz & Ziderman (1990) show that when train-
ing is not veriable to outside rms, workers will be unable to receive a wage
reecting their training level. The training rm has an informational advan-
tage regarding training in comparison to other rms. Consequently, training
will be worthwhile, as productivity increases more than wage payments. Like-
wise, a training rm may also dispose of superior knowledge about a workers
innate characteristics, i.e. abilities, talents and personal qualities. They are
di¢ cult to assess by other rms so that outside wage o¤ers will fall short of
a workers marginal product (Acemoglu & Pischke 1998, 556f.).
Other labor market frictions impeding workers to quit instantaneously for
outside rms may result from mobility restrictions and personal preferences.
For instance, commuting or relocation costs render job turnover costly to
workers. Other frictions are generally related to job search, such as search
costs, search uncertainties and matching problems. Workers will abstain from
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perfect job turnover in regard of the costs associated with it. Again, the
employing rm can appropriate a rent and wages are compressed, rendering
general training investments protable.
Finally, labor market institutions have been identied to cause wage com-
pression, e.g., through minimum wages, collective bargaining, dismissal pro-
tection and unions (Acemoglu & Pischke 1998, Smits & Stromback 2001).
This review demonstrates that human capital investments under imper-
fect competition can explain why rms nance some general training even
though workers are mobile and able to quit. But will human capital invest-
ment be carried out to a socially optimal extent? In fact, these models point
out that training in imperfect labor markets is necessarily accompanied by
a positive externality. Labor market frictions cause workers not to react in-
stantaneously to wage di¤erentials. They yield rents to rms and thereby
provide training incentives. While frictions reduce turnover, they cannot in-
hibit quits entirely. Thus, positive spillovers arise because non-training rms
benet from training by employing workers trained in other rms without
requiring a wage payment equal to the marginal product of labor. This is
commonly referred to as poaching.9 With an externality present, private
incentives are insu¢ cient and training will not be provided to an optimal
extent (Stevens 1994).
In sum, labor market imperfections allow for an explanation of rm-
nanced vocational training, but they also assert the existence of a pos-
itive externality. This contrasts with conventional human capital theory
and therefore invites to reconsider appropriate public policy. Comprehensive
studies analyzing di¤erent policy instruments are lacking. The next section
therefore introduces a simple model in order to put di¤erent policy instru-
ments into analysis.
9More precisely, poaching may be active or passive in nature, i.e. attempts to recruit
skilled workers may be systematic or resulting from general job turnover. However, we do
not pursuit this distinction further.
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3 Simple Model of Vocational Training
This section presents a simple model of apprenticeship training. By consider-
ing an oligopsonistic labor market with frictions, the model allows to explain
why rms partially nance vocational training. However, at the same time,
an externality can be shown to exist which leads to insu¢ cient training.
In later sections, the assumptions of this simple model will be relaxed and
further complications will be added.
3.1 Model Structure and Assumptions
Consider an economy where rms rely on skilled workers to produce goods
and services. Firms can obtain skilled workers in two ways: On the one hand,
they can train unskilled workers by o¤ering apprenticeship training. On the
other hand, they can recruit skilled workers through the labor market by
o¤ering competitive wages.
Wage competition for skilled labor
Let rms compete for the services of skilled workers by posting wage o¤ers.
Workers arbitrage between rmswage o¤ers and choose to work for the
rm with the highest wage. If labor markets were perfect, workers would
instantaneously move to the highest paying rm. This forces rms to pay
skilled workers a wage equal to their marginal product. In such a situation
rms cannot obtain any return for general training expenses. They would
therefore shift the costs of training onto trained workers or provide no general
training at all. Essentially, this is the standard result of human capital theory
according to Becker (1962).
In reality, labor markets are imperfect. Skilled individuals usually do
not quit a rm instantaneously, although they could obtain a somewhat
higher wage elsewhere. The literature review above has specied a number of
labor market frictions that inhibit workers from perfect wage arbitrage, such
as search and switching costs, information asymmetries, and institutional
conditions. We abstain from modeling such frictions in full detail and use
a reduced form instead. More precisely, we simply represent such frictions
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by assuming that workers favor high wages but also have some preferences
over rms. We thereby bring about some attachment to rms even when
wage di¤erences are present. Workers will consequently only quit for another
rm if the wage increase at least compensates for the lost attachment to the
rm.10
Formally, assume workers to di¤er in location. We represent this by the
di¤erentiation parameter . Along the lines of Hotelling (1929) let there be
a mass of homogeneous skilled workers Nt which are uniformly distributed
along a street with length normalized to unity. There are two rms, i =
f1; 2g, that produce at either end of the street. Firms make wage o¤ers wit
in order to attract skilled workers. The higher a rms wage o¤er in period
t, the greater will be its share in recruiting the available skilled workforce.
Workers, on the other hand, incur commuting costs in order to work for a
rm. They will choose to work for the rm with the higher net wage ~wi
where the net wage is simply the wage minus commuting costs.
~wit = wit   Ti ()
Let  be the (time-invariant) linear rate of commuting expenses. A worker
at  faces travel costs T1() =  to work with rm 1 and T2() =  (1  )
to work with rm 2.11 Figure 1 graphically illustrates the allocation of the
workforce depending on rmswage o¤ers and workersresidence locations.
Workers located to the left of ^ will choose the wage o¤er of rm 1, workers
to the right of ^ will choose to work for rm 2.
10As an example, rms could di¤er in their geographical location and workers incur
commuting costs from their residence to the workplace. Therefore, when choosing among
job o¤ers, workers will trade o¤ rmswage o¤ers against the costs of travelling to work.
Alternatively, the quality of a job match could di¤er so that workers must decide between
wages and good job matches. Similarly, a¤ection to a rm could also be grounded to the
liking of particular sectors, products and services, working conditions, workplaces, etc.
11It may reasonably be argued that commuting costs increase convex rather than linear
with the distance from work. Assuming these costs to be quadratic, i.e. T1() = 
2 and
T2() =  (1  )2, leads to the same results. We use the linear set-up for simplicity.
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Figure 1: Hotelling street
Production
Let rmsproduction technology use skilled labor as the only input and
possess constant returns to skilled labor. Equation (1) denotes the production
function of rm i where vit is a workers (constant) marginal product and Nit
is skilled labor employed by rm i in period t.
yit = vitNit (1)
Equation (1) implies that all skills are technologically general. This assump-
tion is made to reect that vocational education, at least in Germany, can
safely be regarded as providing mainly general skills. Contents and schedule
of apprenticeship training are regulated and training leads to a widely ac-
cepted training certicate. Moreover, the notion of specic training can be
questioned to be of great practical relevance.12
Also notice that two interpretations of labor productivity can be given.
The parameter vit could simply indicate the rms technological productivity.
Alternatively, it could signify the rms competitiveness in the output market
12Lazear (2003) forwards that few skills are limited only to a single rm and thereby
doubts sizeable rm-specic skills to exist. Instead he argues that rms seek specic
input-combinations of general skills, stressing the importance of labor markets rather
than skill-types.
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to be able to obtain large selling prices.
Labor supply
Firms o¤ering apprenticeship training to unskilled workers a¤ect future
labor supply. They enlarge the skilled workforce that can potentially be
recruited by all rms. Skilled workers available for employment in the future
period Nt+1 consist of the skilled workforce from the previous period Nt and
the sum of newly trained apprentices Ait.
Nt+1 = Nt +
P
i
Ait (2)
This formulation abstracts from retirement and assumes all apprentices
to enter the labor market. Also, it neglects any acquisition of general skills
outside on-the-job training, for instance through schooling or universities.
These are clearly simplications which could be accounted for in a richer
setting.13
Moreover, let labor supply in each period be an increasing function of
workersnet wages, Nt( ~wt). By assuming labor supply to rise in wage income,
@Nt( ~wt)
@ ~wt
> 0, alternative choices of workerstime outside of the labor market
are taken into account. Such alternatives could be, for instance, the value of
home production and/or unemployment benets.
Apprentices training decision
An unskilled worker faces the decision whether to undergo apprenticeship
training and thereby become a skilled worker or alternatively to remain un-
skilled and obtain an income from simple labor, home production or welfare
benets. Let ut denote the income available to an unskilled worker in period
t. By contrast, apprentices usually receive some apprenticeship pay in the
initial training period, wat , which usually falls considerably short of the in-
come for unskilled labor. However in the future period, upon completion of
13Equation (2) could easily be enriched by retirees exiting from the labor force and uni-
versity graduates entering into it. For this model it is only important that apprenticeship
training increases the future skilled workforce.
15
the vocational education, they can obtain the wage for skilled labor.
Similar to Becker (1962) the apprentices training decision can be for-
malized by an investment problem. A rational, risk-neutral unskilled worker
will choose apprenticeship training if the present value of the expected net
income stream as a skilled worker exceeds the present value of the income
stream from remaining unskilled. This is put formally in equation (3) where
~wt is the net wage of a skilled worker accounting for commuting costs and 
denotes the discount factor at the market rate of interest r,  = 1
1+r
.
wat +
X
t;t6=1
t 1E ( ~wt) 
X
t
t 1ut (3)
This formulation declines any non-monetary costs or benets of apprentice-
ship training, such as joy or e¤ort from learning. Note also that wat can be
negative. In this case, instead of receiving apprenticeship pay, apprentices
transfer tuition feesto the rm in the training period.
For simplicity, normalize the present value of the income stream of an
unskilled worker to zero,
P
t 1ut  0. The participation constraint of an
apprentice to become a skilled worker thus reduces to equation (4).
wat +
X
t+1
t 1E ( ~wt)  0 (4)
Rewriting to
 wat 
X
t+1
t 1E ( ~wt)
this essentially states that an apprentices is willing to initially forgo earnings
and invest wat into vocational training at most equal to the net increase in
income in comparison to remaining remaining unskilled. With alternative
income normalized to zero, forgone earnings may amount at most to the
present value of future net income.
Notice that this participation constraint tacitly assumes workers to face
no credit constraints. In particular, they are able to forego earnings and
transfer the training investment wat to the rm by borrowing against their
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future income. By constrast, if workers are credit constraint or have only
partial access to capital markets, they are unable to carry out the investment
as the wage in the training period is to exceed some threshold value m. In
this case, the additional credit constraint (5) is to be taken into account.
wat  m (5)
Training costs
Apprenticeship training brings about costs to rms. It involves direct
costs that are made up of remuneration to trainers and material expenses.
Moreover, there are indirect costs that result from forgone production when
sta¤ or machines are used for training.
Let ci (Ait) denote the training cost function of rm i where Ait is the
number of apprentices trained by the rm in period t. We assume increas-
ing marginal training costs in order to display limitations to the capacity of
training facilities and training sta¤. Equation (6) summarizes these proper-
ties.
ci (Ait) with c0i > 0; c
00
i > 0; ci (0) = 0 (6)
By presuming an explicit training cost function we tacitly assume that
production and training technology can be separated. This assumption is
often made in the literature to simplify the problem (e.g. Stevens 1994, Ace-
moglu & Pischke 1998). Of course, this assumption does not represent reality
in small companies where older, experienced employees train apprentices and
thereby necessarily incur opportunity costs from forgone production. By con-
trast, large companies often have special training departments and respective
instructing sta¤ so that this assumption is in line with reality in large rms.14
14Note that cost assessments of apprenticeship training often also include direct pay
by the rm to apprentices. Gross training costs measure all expenses of rms and will
therefore also take apprenticeswages into account. By contrast, net training costs take
the contribution of apprentices to production into account (e.g. Bardeleben et al. 1995).
Our formulation makes the simplifying assumption that there is no production value of
apprentices during the training period. Any pay to apprentices therefore only constitutes
a transfer mechanism between rms and workers that allows to shift the costs of training
between both parties.
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Time structure
To keep things simple, we restrict ourselves to a two-period model with
a present and a future period, t = ft; t+ 1g. In the present period, rms
compete for the currently existing skilled workforce. In addition, they may
decide to train unskilled workers through an apprenticeship that will thereby
become skilled workers in the future. We call this period the training period.
In the future period, rms compete anew for skilled workers. With training
being su¢ ciently general, this allows for poaching of the newly trained work-
ers by other rms. We therefore refer to this period as the poaching period.
Thus, the time structure of this two-period model can be summarized as
follows:
 Training period t:
Firms make wage o¤ers wit and take Ait apprentices for training.
Nt(:) workers choose their employer and production takes place.
 Poaching period t+ 1:
Firms make wage o¤ers wi;t+1
Nt+1(:) workers choose their employer and production takes place.
3.2 Private Optimum
With this being the basic set-up let us now solve the model by backward
induction. Consider rst the poaching period. Firms compete for skilled
workers by posting appropriate wage o¤ers, w1;t+1 and w2;t+1. A proportion
of the skilled workforce will take the o¤er at rm 1, while the remainder
will take the o¤er at rm 2. We can infer the share of the skilled workforce
to each rm from the worker located at ^t+1, who is just indi¤erent between
working for either rm. This is the case if net wages equal, or, put di¤erently,
if the arbitrage condition (7) is fullled.
w1;t+1     ^t+1 = w2;t+1    

1  ^t+1

(7)
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The share of workers employed by both rms can therefore be stated as a
function of wages by
^t+1 =
w1;t+1   w2;t+1 + 
2
(8)
and likewise by
1  ^t+1 = w2;t+1   w1;t+1 + 
2
(9)
Firms maximize prots by optimally choosing the wages they pay. Prots
are simply i;t+1 = (vi;t+1   wi;t+1)Ni;t+1 and the objective functions of rms
1 and 2 are therefore
max
fw1;t+1g
n
1;t+1 = (v1;t+1   w1;t+1) ^t+1 (:)Nt+1
o
(10)
max
fw2;t+1g
n
2;t+1 = (v2;t+1   w2;t+1)

1  ^t+1 (:)

Nt+1
o
(11)
From the rst order conditions
 2w1;t+1 + w2;t+1    + v1;t+1 = 0 (12)
 2w2;t+1 + w1;t+1    + v2;t+1 = 0 (13)
we can obtain the reaction functions, i.e. rms optimal wage o¤er as a func-
tion of the other rms wage o¤er.
w1;t+1(w2;t+1) =
1
2
(v1;t+1 + w2;t+1   ) (14)
w2;t+1(w1;t+1) =
1
2
(v2;t+1 + w1;t+1   ) (15)
The second order conditions for a local maximum are fullled with @
2i;t+1
@2wi;t+1
=
 2 < 0. From equating the reaction functions then follow the equilibrium
wages w1;t+1 and w

2;t+1.
w1;t+1 =
2
3
v1;t+1 +
1
3
v2;t+1    (16)
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w2;t+1 =
1
3
v1;t+1 +
2
3
v2;t+1    (17)
Using equations (8) and (9), the equilibrium wages w1;t+1 and w

2;t+1 deter-
mine the allocation of skilled workers across both rms in period t + 1. A
share ^

t+1 of the workforce is employed by rm 1 and a share (1   t+1) by
rm 2.
^

t+1 =
w1;t+1   w2;t+1 + 
2
=
1
2
+
v1;t+1   v2;t+1
6
(18)
1  ^t+1 =
w2;t+1   w1;t+1 + 
2
=
1
2
  v1;t+1   v2;t+1
6
(19)
Using w1;t+1, w

2;t+1 and ^

t+1, equilibrium rm prots can be derived as
1;t+1 =
 
v1;t+1   w1;t+1

^

t+1Nt+1 =
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1 + 3)2
18
Nt+1 (20)
2;t+1 =
 
v2;t+1   w2;t+1
 
1  ^t+1

Nt+1 =
(v2;t+1   v1;t+1 + 3)2
18
Nt+1
(21)
These results can be summarized in a proposition.
Proposition 1 When labor market frictions render job mobility costly, i.e.
for  > 0, workers refrain from perfect wage arbitrage and show some attach-
ment to a rm. This gives rms some wage-setting power. In equilibrium,
rms post wages below the workers marginal product, wi;t+1 < vi;t+1. Firms
therefore earn some employment rents and realize positive prots, i;t+1 > 0.
Proof. See appendix.
In order to easily understand these results, consider the case of homo-
geneous technology across rms, v1;t+1 = v2;t+1 = vt+1. With identical pro-
duction functions, rms will also post identical wage o¤ers for skilled labor,
w1;t+1 = w

2;t+1 = w

t+1, and the equilibrium wage is simply w

t+1 = vt+1   .
This can be easily interpreted: A worker located at rm 1 would incur com-
muting costs  to quit for an employment at rm 2. The same is true,
vice versa, for the worker at rm 2. Firms can therefore safely reduce
the wage from the marginal product vt+1 by an amount  without risking
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to lose all workers. Thus, rms earn a rent of  from employing a skilled
worker. With identical wage o¤ers, both rms will acquire half of the avail-
able workforce, N1;t+1 = N

2;t+1 =
1
2
Nt+1, and earn prots from employment
of 1;t+1 = 

2;t+1 =
1
2
Nt+1.
For heterogeneous technology, in contrast to the case of homogeneous
technology, there is wage dispersion and di¤ering rm sizes in equilibrium.
Wages increase in own, but decrease in foreign productivity,
@wi;t+1
@vi;t+1
 0 and
@wi;t+1
@vj;t+1
 0. These results conform to empirical estimates of the labor market
and also reproduce the outcomes from other frictional labor market models
(e.g. Montgomery 1991, Lang 1991).
With this being the situation in the poaching period let us now turn to
the training period. In this period, rms compete for the (initial) skilled
workforce Nt and decide whether to provide costly training or not. Firms
objective functions consist of prots from employing skilled workers in the
present and the future period reduced by pay to apprentices and training
costs, i;t+1+it watAit ci (Ait). We can thus characterize rmsdecision
problem by
argmax
fwit;Aitg

i;t+1 + (vit   wit)Nit   watAit   ci (Ait)
	
(22)
In this period, just as in the poaching period, rmsshares of the available
workforce are determined using the indi¤erent worker ^t. Deriving an indi¤er-
ent worker analoguous to equation (7) then allows to write the optimization
problem for rm 1
argmax
fw1t;A1tg
n
R1;t+1Nt+1 + (v1t   w1t) ^tNt   watA1t   c1 (A1t)
o
(23)
and for rm 2
argmax
fw2t;A2tg
n
R2;t+1Nt+1 + (v2t   w2t)

1  ^t

Nt   watA2t   c2 (A2t)
o
(24)
The rst order conditions with respect to the wage o¤ers w1t and w2t are
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given by (25) and (26) which, as before, represent a pair of reaction functions
w1t (w2t) and w

2t (w1t).
 2w1t + w2t    + v1t = 0 (25)
 2w2t + w1t    + v2t = 0 (26)
Setting equal then again allows to solve for the equilibrium wages.
w1t =
2
3
v1t +
1
3
v2t    (27)
w2t =
1
3
v1t +
2
3
v2t    (28)
Equations (27) and (28) state, analoguous to before, that wages for skilled
workers in period t are below the marginal product of labor. Firmsrespective
shares of the workforce in period t are ^

t and 1  ^

t .
Now take the rst order conditions with respect to the number of ap-
prentices by the rm. The second order conditions are satised with @
2
@Ait
=
 c00i < 0. Thus, equations (29) and (30) display the conditions for optimal
rm provision of apprenticeship training.
R1;t+1   wa1t   c01 (A1t) = 0 (29)
R2;t+1   wa2t   c02 (A2t) = 0 (30)
When rms possess all bargaining power, the pay to apprentices in the train-
ing period can be inferred from the participation constraint (4), i.e. wat =  
E ( ~wt+1). Inserting into the rst order conditions then gives the optimality
conditions for vocational training.
R1;t+1 + E ( ~wt+1) = c
0
1 (A

1t) (31)
R2;t+1 + E ( ~wt+1) = c
0
2 (A

2t) (32)
From these conditions we can deduce proposition (2).
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Proposition 2 In the private optimum, vocational training is carried out
such that marginal costs and returns of an additional apprentice are equal.
Firms provide A1t and A

2t apprenticeships. Costs and returns from appren-
ticeship training are shared by the apprentice and the rm in the training
contract.
Proof. Obvious from (31) and (32).
The intuition for this result is straightforward: Apprenticeship training
is benecial to both parties in the training contract. Both are therefore also
willing to bear some training costs. The apprentice, on the one hand, is
turned from an unskilled worker to a skilled worker. She is willing to invest
in vocational training as she can thereby expect an increase in her future net
income. The rm, on the other hand, earns some returns from training, too.
It obtains a rent from employing former apprentices as skilled workers. This
rent occurs because mobility frictions allow for wages below the marginal
product of labor. It can be used to nance costly general training.
The private optimum for vocational training is disturbed when appren-
tices face nancial constraints. Then, instead of the participation constraint,
apprenticeship pay is subject to the credit constraint condition (5). Appren-
tices can only participate in the training costs as long as wat  m. Under
binding credit restrictions, the optimality conditions for vocational training
are
1;t+1  m = c01 (Acc1t) (33)
2;t+1  m = c02 (Acc2t) (34)
Proposition 3 Credit constraints reduce the private optimum for vocational
training to Accit , where A
cc
it < A

it.
Proof. The credit constraint is binding for wat = m where m >  E ( ~wt+1).
Rewriting to  m < E ( ~wt+1) and inserting allows to compare the training
conditions under credit constraints (33) and (34) to the normal case (31) and
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(32). With the left-hand side smaller under credit constraints, it becomes
immediately clear that Accit < A

it.
Due to capital market imperfections and informational restraints, the
apprentice cannot borrow against her future net income that would return
from vocational training. Being credit constraint, the apprentice thus cannot
make the necessary training investments. Training will therefore be lower
than it would otherwise be. This result essentially replicates earlier results
from human capital theory in the context of apprenticeship training (e.g.
Becker 1962, Smits & Stromback 2001).
From comparative-static analysis some further results can be derived that
characterize the private optimum. They are summarized in the following
propositions:
Proposition 4 Apprenticeship training
a) increases in rms with higher productivity, @A

it
@vit
> 0,
b) decreases in the opponents productivity, @A

it
@vjt
< 0,
c) decreases in the interest rate, @A

it
@r
< 0,
d) decreases in the training costs, @A

i
@ci
< 0.
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem on the optimal training condi-
tions (29) and (30).
A higher productivity increases the value of a skilled worker to a rm
and thus stimulates to train more. By contrast, a higher productivity of the
opponent decreases the ability to retain skilled workers. Larger training costs
and a higher interest rate obviously diminish training.
Proposition 5 Labor market frictions increase rmsshare in the training
costs, but decrease overall, apprenticeship training, @A

it
@
< 0.
Proof. Apply the implicit function theorem on conditions (31) and (32) and
obtain @A

it
@
< 0. For detailed formal proof see appendix.
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This result can be explained quite intuitively. Rising labor market fric-
tions dampen wage arbitrage by workers and increase rms monopsony
power. The wage for skilled workers decreases, thereby obviously dimin-
ishing the incentives for unskilled workers to seek training. By contrast, a
lower wage allows rms to obtain larger rents from employing workers which
improves rmstraining incentives. Overall, however, private incentives de-
crease in the costs of labor market frictions as the training rm cannot collect
all rents from training.
Proposition 6 Firms di¤er in training quotas it. In particular, a rms
training quota increases in own productivity, @it
@vit
> 0, and decreases in costs
to apprentices, @it
@ci
< 0.
Proof. Let it dene the training quota of rm i where it = AitNit . Inserting
the values from the individual rms optimum and applying the implicit
function theorem then leads to the proposition.
Clearly, di¤erences in apprenticeship training will also be reected in
training quotas, i.e. in the proportion of apprentices to employees. The
model thereby allows to account for empirical observations of the German
apprenticeship system. In reality, training quotas di¤er strongly within a
sector as well as across sectors.
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3.3 Social optimum
The analysis so far showed that rms provide apprenticeship training and the
training costs are shared by the rm and the apprentice. It is now of interest
whether the actions of the contracting parties are also socially e¢ cient. We
will therefore compare the private optimum with the social optimum.
In this simple two-rm two-period model, social welfare can be denoted
by the net output produced by skilled workers in both periods. Training costs
are subtracted because resources put to vocational training have alternative
uses.
W =
X
t=1;2
t 1Wt  
X
i=1;2
ci (Ait) (35)
In period t, social welfare Wt consists of rmsprots and net wages.
Wt =
Z ^t
0
(v1t   w1t + w1t   )Ntd+
Z 1
^t
(v2t   w2t + w2t    (1  ))Ntd
(36)
The rst term denotes prots and net wages from employment at rm 1 and
while the second term does so for rm 2. Simplifying and rearranging leads
to equation (37). Intuitively, it states that social welfare is total production
net of commuting and training costs.
W =
P
t=1;2
t 1Nt
 Z ^t
0
(v1t   )d +
Z 1
^

t
(v2t    (1  ))d
!
 
X
i=1;2
ci (Ait)
(37)
Solving the integral, inserting for ^

t and some algebraic rearrangements then
gives equation (38). See the appendix for detailed derivation.
W =
P
t=1;2
t 1Nt

v1t + v2t
2
+
5
36
(v1t   v2t)2   1
4


 
X
i=1;2
ci (Ait) (38)
The social planners problem is to optimally choose the number of ap-
prentices to train.
max
fA1t;A2tg
W (A1t; A2t) (39)
26
From the rst order conditions then obtain the conditions for socially optimal
apprenticeship training A

it in each rm.


v1t + v2t
2
+
5
36
(v1t   v2t)2   1
4


  c0i
 
A

it

= 0 8i = f1; 2g (40)
This allows to state proposition (7).
Proposition 7 In the private optimum, apprenticeship training in each rm
is lower than socially desirable, i.e. Ait < A

it.
Proof. Compare the condition for the social optimum (40) with the condi-
tions for the private optimum (29) and (30) to derive that too few apprentices
receive training, Ait < A

it. See the appendix for detailed proof.
The intuition for this result can be put as follows: Apprenticeship training
is socially ine¢ cient as the social returns of apprenticeship training exceed
the private returns collected by the apprentices and the training rm.
To pinpoint this result, look at the returns from vocational training sep-
arately. For the apprentice the return from vocational training is the present
value of the expected net wage as a skilled worker.
Rw = E
 
~wt+1

The expected net wage can be calculated using w1;t+1 and w

2;t+1.
Rw = 
 
v1;t+1 + v2;t+1
2
+
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2
6
  5
4

!
See the appendix for detailed algebraic derivation.
For the training rm the return consists of the rent that is earned in the
future on skilled employment from apprentices that remain with the rm. It
arises as the workers marginal product exceeds the wage due to frictions.
Note that rents di¤er across rms according to labor productivity.
R1;f = 
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1 + 3)2
18
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R2;f = 
(v2;t+1   v1;t+1 + 3)2
18
Private returns collected by the parties in the training contract are
R1;priv = Rw +R1;f =
5v1;t+1 + v2;t+1
6
+
4 (v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2
18
  3
4

R2;priv = Rw +R2;f =
v1;t+1 + 5v2;t+1
6
+
4 (v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2
18
  3
4

Social returns are given by
Rsocial = 

v1;t+1 + v2;t+1
2
+
5
36
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2   1
4


Finally, an externality of vocational education can be easily derived from
calculating the di¤erence between social and private returns.
Xi = Rsocial  Rpriv
Thus, the positive externality associated with an additional apprenticeship
by each rm is given by
X1 =
1
2
   (v1   v2)
12
(v1   v2 + 4)
X2 =
1
2
   (v2   v1)
12
(v2   v1 + 4)
Proposition 8 Vocational training brings about a positive externality onto
other rms. The externality decreases in rms productivity, but increases in
opponents productivity and labor market frictions.
Proof. From comparative-static analysis follows @Xi
@vi;t+1
< 0, @Xi
@vj;t+1
> 0, and
@Xi
@
> 0 for i; j = f1; 2g ; i 6= j.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Because of wage competi-
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tion among rms, only a share of apprentices remain with the training rm.
Put di¤erently, due to poaching of skilled workers, vocational training carries
a positive externality onto other rms.
As an illustration, consider the case of homogeneous technology as before.
By setting v1;t+1 = v2;t+1 = vt+1, the expected return from apprenticeship
training to an unskilled worker is simply
Rw = 

vt+1   5
4


Likewise, rmsreturns from training an apprentice are
Rf = R1f = R2f = 

2
Private returns of the apprentice and the rm are therefore
Rpriv = Rw +Rf = 

vt+1   3
4


Social returns are however
Rsocial = vt+1   1
4

which clearly indicates a positive externality from training an apprentice.
X = X1 = X2 = 

2
Intuitively, there is a return to vocational training that can neither be ob-
tained by the apprentice, nor the training rm, but rather accrues to the
rival rm. The opponent obtains a rent which arises because it can poach
some apprentices without being required to pay these skilled workers their
full marginal product. In the symmetric case this rent amounts to  
2
. With
some returns from training remaining unconsidered by the private parties,
vocational training will be short of its socially e¢ cient level, Ait < A

it. Fig-
ure (2) summarizes this situation for the symmetric case with homogeneous
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technology.
Figure 2: Social and private returns to education
3.4 Discussion
In this simple model, due to costly labor market frictions, skilled workers
are inhibited from perfect wage arbitrage. There is some attachment for a
skilled individual to work for rm i although a higher wage could be earned
elsewhere. These labor market imperfections allow rms to obtain some
rents from employment. They induce rms not only to provide but also to
partially nance apprenticeship training providing general skills. Thereby
the net costs of training carried by rms can be explained.
Moreover, the model also proposes the existence of an externality from
vocational training. O¤ering apprenticeships allows for positive spillovers on
rival rms that result from the possibility to poach workers. While frictions
cause some attachment of workers to the rm, some fraction still quits for
another employer, ridding the training rm from its investment. With train-
ing e¤orts distorted, from a social point of view too few apprenticeships are
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provided.
This model drew on a number of simplifying assumptions. Firstly, the
model is limited to two periods only. Secondly, apprenticeship training con-
sists of perfectly general skills with no rm-specic element. Thirdly, appren-
tices and workers stay within the sector and there is no retirement. These
assumptions can be relaxed, altering the results quantitatively, but not qual-
itatively.
In the following section, emphasis will be put on the question whether
public policy possesses instruments to internalize the externality and thereby
increase social welfare.
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4 Incentive Schemes
It was noted above that already Pigou (1912) named poaching as the cause
of underprovision of vocational education. With training possessing positive
social returns, he proposed to introduce a system of bounties and taxes
as a means to provide additional training incentives to rms. This section
will take up this proposal. It will analyze in further detail several incen-
tive schemes for vocational education. Other policy instruments, such as
the regulation of training contracts, although also conceivable, will not be
considered here. They will be the focus of another paper.
4.1 Pigouvian Subsidies
For theoretical reference consider at rst the case of ideal Pigouvian subsidies.
Under this scheme, rm i receives a subsidy zi per apprentice it takes for
training. The total subsidy payment i to rm i is therefore
i = ziAi (41)
The subsidy payment alters rmsobjective functions in the training period
by an additional term. The optimization problems for rm 1 and 2 thus
become
argmax
fw1t;A1tg
fR1;t+1Nt+1 + (v1t   w1t)N1t   watA1t   c1 (A1t) + z1A1tg (42)
argmax
fw2t;A2tg
fR2;t+1Nt+1 + (v2t   w2t)N2t   watA2t   c2 (A2t) + z2A2tg (43)
The rst order conditions with respect to rmswage o¤ers remain un-
a¤ected. Equilibrium wages in the training period are therefore again given
by equations (27) and (28). However, the subsidy payment modies rms
optimality conditions for the number of apprentices.
R1;t+1   wat + z1 = c01(APigou1t ) (44)
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R2;t+1   wat + z2 = c02(APigou2t ) (45)
Equations (44) and (45) state, similar to before, that rms will o¤er voca-
tional training such that the marginal returns from an additional appren-
tice equal the marginal costs. Naturally, with the subsidy payment raising
the marginal returns, the optimal number of apprenticeships in each rm
increases. Using the inverse of the cost function, the optimal number of
apprenticeships provided by each rm can be deduced.
APigou1 = c
0 1
1 (:) = 1 (z1; v1;t+1; v2;t+1; ; ) (46)
APigou2 = c
0 1
2 (:) = 2 (z1; v1;t+1; v2;t+1; ; ) (47)
A benevolent social planner would strive to set the subsidy such that the
private training conditions equal the social training condition. Thereby we
can state the next proposition:
Proposition 9 An ideal Pigouvian subsidy scheme allows to restore e¢ -
ciency. Optimal subsidy rates for each rm are
z1 = 

1
2
   (v1 v2)2
12
  (v1 v2)
3

 X1 (48)
z2 = 

1
2
   (v2 v1)2
12
  (v2 v1)
3

 X2 (49)
Proof. Equate conditions (44) and (40) as well as (45) and (40) and easily
obtain z1 and z2.
The intuition to this result is common. By providing rms with a sub-
sidy per apprentice that equals the marginal externality, private and social
incentives to training are aligned. The positive spillovers from apprenticeship
training are internalized and rst best training levels can be achieved.
In analogy with the externality, comparative-static analysis shows that
the optimal subsidy rate zi decreases in rms own productivity vi;t+1, but
increases in the opponents productivity vj;t+1 and the friction parameter .
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Figure 3: Pigouvian subsidy
Also note that the ideal subsidy does not depend at all on rms training
cost function.
Figure (3) depicts this situation. In the private optimum, rm i equalizes
the marginal private returns of an additional apprenticeship Ri;priv to its
marginal returns c0i. An additional subsidy per apprentice zi increases the
marginal private returns such that the social optimum A

i can be achieved.
The Pigouvian subsidy thereby brings about a welfare gain that is equivalent
to the striped triangle.
Although an ideal Pigouvian subsidy possesses a strong theoretical appeal
for its ability to correct for the positive spillovers from vocational training,
its premises are highly unrealistic. In particular, the instrument requires to
calculate subsidy rates at the rm level. As the externality arises because of
poaching, the specic subsidy must be determined from rmsfuture labor
productivities. This demands to gather and process very accurate and de-
tailed information on production as well as output market parameters, which
would already cause severe di¢ culties in practice. Additionally, and making
matters even worse, the interests of rms and government to disclose the
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information may strongly diverge. While the government seeks to obtain
precise information to assess the size of the externality, rms have an inter-
est to falsely state their productivity levels in order to obtain larger subsidy
payments.15
Clearly, with only limited and inaccurate information available, the pos-
sibility to calculate rm-specic subsidies is strongly reduced. Alternatively,
one may therefore consider to introduce a uniform subsidy that provides ad-
ditional training incentives on average for the economy or a particular sector.
Although this departs from the theoretical ideal, such an instrument could
be much simpler to determine and administer. It will now be analyzed.
4.2 Uniform Subsidies
Under a uniform subsidy scheme, government is constraint to a single subsidy
rate z. The total payment to rm i thus becomes
i = zAi (50)
As before, include the uniform subsidy in rmsdecision problem. The opti-
mality conditions for apprenticeship training are now
R1;t+1   wat + z = c01(Auni1 ) (51)
R2;t+1   wat + z = c02(Auni2 ) (52)
Firms optimal training levels Auni1 and A
uni
2 increase in the subsidy rate.
They can again be determined according to
Auni1 = c
0 1
1 (:) = 1 (z; v1;t+1; v2;t+1; ; ) (53)
Auni2 = c
0 1
2 (:) = 2 (z; v1;t+1; v2;t+1; ; ) (54)
When introducing a uniform subsidy scheme, government faces the task to
15More precisely, government faces asymmetric information with respect to rmspro-
ductivity which cause an adverse selection problem to arise.
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determine the appropriate subsidy rate z such that social welfareW (Auni1 (z); A
uni
2 (z))
is maximized. After some simplications, the governments optimization prob-
lem can be stated by
argmax
fzg
( P
i=1;2
Aunii  
 
v1+v2
2
+ 5
36
(v1   v2)2   14
  P
i=1;2
c0i
 
Aunii
)
(55)
The rst order condition (56) determines the optimal subsidy rate z

.
P
i=1;2
@Aunii
@z
   v1+v2
2
+ 5
36
(v1   v2)2   14
  P
i=1;2
c0i
 
Aunii
 @Aunii
@z
= 0 (56)
Equation (56) states that, for the optimal subsidy rate, the sum of the mar-
ginal social returns from an increase in the subsidy rate equals the sum of
the marginal increases in the training costs. Moreover, it allows to deduce
the next proposition.
Proposition 10 A uniform Pigouvian subsidy scheme, in contrast to an
ideal Pigouvian subsidy scheme, cannot achieve Pareto-optimality. At the
optimal subsidy rate z there will be over- and undertraining .
Proof. Rearrange the rst order condition (56) and obtain
P
i=1;2
@Aunii
@z
 

 
v1+v2
2
+ 5
36
(v1   v2)2   14
  c0i  Aunii  = 0
Note that the term in the round brackets displays the social training condi-
tion. In Pareto-optimum, this term should equal zero for both rms. How-
ever, unless rms were identical, the training cost functions and also the
number of apprentices vary across rms. But with c0i(A
uni
i ) 6= c0j(Aunij ), the
social training condition cannot be fullled and training therefore cannot be
e¢ cient. Moreover, because @A
uni
i
@z
> 0, the whole condition equalizes to zero
only if the bracket term is positive for one rm, and negative for the other.
Thereby, it is clearly implied that the optimal subsidy causes overtraining in
one rm and undertraining in the other.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. Subsidization leads rms
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to increase training, but government is constraint to set a single subsidy rate.
Because the size of the training externality varies across rms, the optimal
subsidy will exceed the ideal amount for the low externality rm and fall
short of the ideal amount at the high externality rm. Hence, the Pareto
optimal allocation cannot be achieved.
This can be demonstrated graphically in gure (4). Without a subsidy
scheme, rms take A1t and A

2t apprentices for training which equates the
private marginal returns R1;priv and R2;priv to the marginal training costs c0.
The social optimal number of apprentices at each rm, A

1t and A

2t, follows
from the intersection with Rsocial. An uniform subsidy z now raises the
marginal returns to R1;priv + z and R2;priv + z. Vocational training thereby
increases to Auni1t and A
uni
2t . This leads to undertraining in rm 1, A
uni
1t < A

1t,
and overtraining in rm 2, Auni2t < A

2t.
Welfare e¤ects can also be displayed within the graph. The uniform sub-
sidy brings about welfare gains from increasing training above the private
level (striped areas). However, welfare losses from overtraining must be sub-
stracted (shaded area). The net welfare e¤ect is clearly positive. Moreover,
for the optimal uniform subsidy, the marginal social loss from overtraining
equals the marginal social gain from larger subsidization. Or, put di¤erently,
this is equivalent to Rsocial   (R1;priv + z) =   (Rsocial   (R2;priv + z)).
Because a uniform subsidy scheme cannot achieve rst best training, this
instrument cannot restore Pareto-e¢ ciency. However, its introduction can
be shown to be Pareto-improving.16
Proposition 11 The introduction of a small uniform subsidy leads to a
Pareto-improvement.
Proof. At a subsidy rate of zero, the welfare function is increasing in z. Or,
formally, @W
@z
jz=0 > 0.
Despite the constraint to use a uniform subsidy rate, introducing a sub-
sidy scheme is welfare-improving. A small positive subsidy increases training
16For the distinction between Pareto-optimality and Pareto-improvement see Atkinson
& Stiglitz (1980).
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Figure 4: Uniform subsidy
at the margin. It thereby slightly internalizes the externality which is bene-
cial to welfare.
Note, however, that the analysis so far did not spend any thoughts on
the nancing of the subsidy payments. In fact, it implicitly assumed cost-
less funding from the general budget. Yet, the government budget itself is
constrained because public funds are limited and subject to alternative uses.
Moreover, non-distortionary revenues from lump-sum taxes are not feasible.
The nancing of the subsidy payments may therefore require a tax increase
or the introduction of a new distortionary tax. Therefore, without taking the
funding of the subsidy payments into account, the present results are to be
treated with strict caution.
4.3 Training levies
Up to now the analysis focussed on subsidy schemes to internalize positive
spillovers from training. However, training levies are often proposed, too. In
fact, this policy proposal has recently received much attention in Germany.
This section will therefore take this instrument to a rigorous formal analysis.
The basic idea of any training levy scheme is to penalize rms that do
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not train at all or only insu¢ ciently. These rms are considered to benet
from positive spillovers and to free-ride on the e¤orts of training rms. Pre-
sumably, by imposing training levies, non-training rms will also participate
in the training costs and receive additional incentives for their own training
e¤orts.
Training levy schemes exist in several European countries, such as Britain,
Denmark, or France. However, their design varies considerably. They can,
for instance, possess the form of revenue-generating levy schemes, levy-
exemption-schemes, or levy-grant-systems. Although all schemes impose
training levies, di¤erences occur in the collection and spending of the funds
raised. Thus, despite their close similarity, these policies will di¤er somewhat
in their economic consequences and call for a detailed analysis. This task,
however, would reach beyond the scope of this work.17 In what follows, focus
will be put on the training levy scheme that has recently been proposed for
Germany.
The training levy scheme under consideration in Germany aims to penal-
ize rms that train not at all or insu¢ ciently while simultaneously rewarding
rms that train exceedingly. Although the bill entered the formal legislative
readings, it has been put on hold prior to the nal vote in the federal par-
liament.18 The issue whether to pass the law or not remains at present still
heavily debated. If it were enacted, the proposed federal bill would enable the
federal government to collect levies from rms that train less than a certain
standard and redistribute the revenues to rms that exceed this standard.
The benchmark is a mandatory training quota that has been set to 7% of
the employed workforce. If a rm falls short of this prescribed quota, it is
to pay a training levy, and if it exceeds the quota, it is eligible to additional
funds. For details to the law proposal see the draft in Deutscher Bundestag
(2004), in particular §§9-11 BerASichG.
17For an overview and international comparison on various policies towards nancing
training see in particular Gasskov (1994). Greenhalgh (1999), Stevens (1999) and Bosch
(2004) provide some account of training levies throughout the world.
18For the legislative status, the precise text of the law and an explanatory statement to
the legislative intentions see in particular Deutscher Bundestag (2004).
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The amounts of levies or grants to a rm increase with the deviation from
the benchmark level. The scheme thereby intends to discriminate between
varying training e¤orts across rms. More precisely, rms are entitled to a
subsidy for every apprentice exceeding the training quota.19 By contrast,
rms are levied a certain penalty per employee if the training quota is not
attained.20
In constrast to the subsidy rates and the mandatory training quota, the
law proposal leaves the penalty rate unspecied. Instead, it is to be deter-
mined such that the whole scheme is self-nancing, i.e. that subsidies and
administrative expenses can be nanced.
In order to allow for a detailed economic analysis, we will now formulate
this proposal. Let it again be the payment to rm i resulting from the
scheme in the training period. Moreover, let it dene the training quota of
rm i, i.e. the rms ratio of apprentices to skilled employees.
it =
Ait
Nit
(57)
Dene ^ to be the mandatory training quota that species the desired train-
ing standard. Now, if a rm falls short of the mandatory level, it < ^, the
rm has to pay a penalty p for every skilled worker it employs. Because the
penalty wishes to reect the di¤erences in training across rms, the total
levy decreases for every apprentice the rm trains. Accordingly, the work-
force that would be equivalent to the actual number of apprentices at the
mandatory training quota, i.e. N^ = 1
^
Ait, is deducted from the levy base.
19The subsidy amounts under discussion range from e580 and e1240 per apprentice
per month depending on the trained profession. The variation in the training subsidies is
aimed to reect trainee wages that di¤er strongly across occupations.
20The law denes apprentices as those trainees employed by a rm that fall under the
conditions of the apprenticeship training law. Employees are full-time workers that are
subject to social insurance contributions. Thus, the law excludes interns, student appren-
tices, freelance workers, temporary workers and so-called minor employments. Thereby
some substitution between di¤erent trainee and worker categories may arise resulting in
distortions from the levy-grant scheme. These issues are however neglected here.
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Training levies to rm i are thus calculated according to
levyit =  

Nit   1
^
Ait

 p
By constrast, if a rm exceeds the mandatory level, it > ^, the rm receives
a grant z per apprentice it trains in addition to the mandatory training level.
The training grant to rm i is thus
grantit = (Ait   ^Nit)  z
Equation (58) summarizes the payment to rm i resulting from the proposed
training levy scheme.
it =
8><>:
   Nit   1^Ait  p
(Ait   ^Nit)  z
0
if
it < ^
it > ^
it = ^
9>=>; (58)
Factoring out Nit, using (57) to replace for rms training quota and rear-
ranging then gives
it =
8><>:
(it   ^)  p^Nit
(it   ^)  zNit
0
if
it < ^
it > ^
it = ^
9>=>; (59)
Let us assume rms are given the same nancial incentive for an addi-
tional apprentice, regardless of whether the rm exceeds or undershoots the
training quota. Then, as follows from (59), penalty and subsidy must obey
the relation p
^
= z or p = z^.21 The net payment thereby simplies to
it = (it   ^) zNit (60)
Note the close similarity of equation (60) to an incentive scheme introduced
21This assumption could be justied on e¢ ciency grounds because otherwise an addi-
tional redistributive element would be introduced into the scheme.
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by Falkinger (1996) for the private provision of public goods which proposes
to punish or reward deviations from the average contribution level.
In equation (60) replace for the training quota using (57), and the scheme
can be split up into two parts.
it = zAit   z^Nit (61)
One term depends on the number of apprentices, the other on the number
of employees. For notational ease, set  = z^. The payment term simplies
to it = zAit  Nit whereby it becomes evident that rms receive a uniform
subsidy z per apprentice and pay a tax  per employee. This directly leads
to the following conclusion.
Proposition 12 The proposed training levy scheme is essentially a tax-subsidy-
system. It subsidizes apprenticeship training through an additional employ-
ment tax.
Proof. Obvious.
Despite their apparent similarity, there are nevertheless notable di¤er-
ences between tax-subsidy-systems and levy-grant-systems. Under a tax-
subsidy-system, an economic agent is paying taxes as well as receiving sub-
sidies for providing a benecial activity. All monetary ows pass through
the public budget. Under a levy-grant-system, by contrast, the agent only
exchanges a net payment with the public budget, i.e. a levy net of any subsi-
dies. The volume of the scal transfers is therefore much smaller. Essentially,
levy-grant-systems possess the feature of central clearing while tax-subsidy-
systems do not. This can bring about some savings in administration, col-
lection, and payment transactions.
The proposed levy scheme is self-nancing only if the budget balances.
This is the case when all levies raised equal grants and administrative ex-
penses. Assume the scheme to work without any cost.22 The budget con-
22Of course, this is not an innocuous assumption. It is made here for expositional
purposes. Further below the analysis will reconsider the issue of administrative costs more
explicitly.
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straint is thus given byX
i
it =
X
i
(it   ^)  zNit =
X
i
zAit  
X
i
Nit = 0 8t (62)
Proposition 13 The budget of the training levy scheme balances if the manda-
tory training quota is set to equal the average training quota.
Proof. From (62) follows that the budget balances for
P
i (it   ^)  zNit =
0. This can be rearranged to
P
i itNit = ^
P
iNit which then leads to
^ =
P
i AitP
iNit
 .
Intuitively, by setting the mandatory training quota to equal the average
quota, the budget will automatically be equalized as training below and above
this standard will reciprocally balance.
With this being some general remarks on the proposed training levy
scheme, now investigate how rmsdecisions are a¤ected. The optimization
problems for rm 1 and 2 are again altered. They now become
argmax
fw1t;A1tg
fR1;t+1Nt+1 + (v1t   w1t   )N1t   watA1t   c1 (A1t) + zA1tg (63)
argmax
fw2t;A2tg
fR2;t+1Nt+1 + (v2t   w2t   )N2t   watA2t   c2 (A2t) + zA2tg (64)
The rst order conditions with respect to rmswage o¤ers w1t and w2t in
the training period are given by (65) and (66) which, as before, represent a
pair of reaction functions.
 2w1t + w2t       + v1t = 0 (65)
 2w2t + w1t       + v2t = 0 (66)
Setting equal again allows to solve for the equilibrium wages wlevy1t and w
levy
2t .
wlevy1t =
2
3
v1t +
1
3
v2t       (67)
wlevy2t =
1
3
v1t +
2
3
v2t       (68)
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Proposition 14 The employee tax to nance the training subsidies is fully
shifted onto workers.
Proof. This follows from (67) and (68) with @w
levy
it
@
=  1.
The intuition for this result can be put as follows: The employee tax
decreases the value product that a rm can earn from employing skilled
workers. Firms will therefore reduce their wage o¤er by this amount. The
training levy scheme thus burdens skilled workers employed in the training
period and leaves rmsprots una¤ected.
It must be noted, however, that this proposition, at least partially, results
from the constant labor productivity that is exogeneous to the rm. Essen-
tially, this assumes the output market to be perfectly competitive, such that
the employee tax cannot be shifted onto consumers by increasing prices.
So far, it has become evident that the training levy scheme subsidizes
additional training by a uniform subsidy z that is nanced by a tax  = z^
levied on employment. It has two immediate e¤ects. Firstly, the subsidy
encourages additional apprenticeship training. Similar to the uniform sub-
sidy scheme, marginal training returns increase for all rms. Secondly, the
employment tax reduces the wage o¤ers to the present skilled workforce. In
comparison to alternative income sources, skilled work becomes relatively less
attractive. In the training period, labor supply will decrease and production
output will shrink.
Thus, when introducing the levy scheme, a benevolent government will
trade o¤ the welfare gains from additional training against the welfare losses
for the present workforce. Additionally, it is constraint to a balanced budget.
Aiming to determine the optimal subsidy and tax rates, the governments
decision problem can be displayed by
max
fz;^g
W =
P
t=1;2
t 1Wt  
P
i=1;2
ci(A
levy
i )
s.t.
P
i=1;2

zAlevyit   z^Nit

= 0
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This constrained maximization problem can be solved using Lagranges com-
mon method. The Lagrangian problem is given by (69).
max
fz;^g
L = P
t=1;2
t 1Wt  
P
i=1;2
ci(A
levy
it )  
P
i=1;2

zAlevyit   z^Nit

(69)
The rst order conditions are
@L
@z
=
P
t=1;2
t 1 @Wt
@z
  P
i=1;2
c0i
@Alevyit
@z
   P
i=1;2

z
@Alevyit
@z
  z^@Nit
@z

= 0
@L
@^
=
P
t=1;2
t 1 @Wt
@^
   P
i=1;2
  zNit   z^@Nit@^  = 0
@L
@
=
P
i=1;2

zAlevyit   z^Nit

= 0
Using these equations, the socially optimal values for z and ^ can be solved
for.
P
t=1;2
t 1
0@@Wt
@z
+ @Wt
@^
P
i=1;2

@Alevyit
@z
  ^@Nit
@z

P
i=1;2
 
Nit + ^
@Nit
@^

1A = P
i=1;2
c0i
@Alevyit
@z
Similar to before, address the question whether the introduction of the
training levy scheme would be welfare-improving. From the balanced budget
constraint (62) follows that the mandatory training quota cannot be set in-
dependently, but depends positively on the subsidy rate chosen. Or formally
^(z) with ^0 > 0. Now using this budget constraint, the welfare problem
can be rewritten as a function W (z; ^(z)). Take the total di¤erential with
respect to the subsidy rate, dW
dz
= @W
@z
+ @W
@^
@^
@z
, which is stated in (70).
dW
dz
=
P
t=1;2
t 1
 
@Wt
@z
+ @Wt
@^
@^
@z
  P
i=1;2
c0i
@Alevyit
@z
R 0 (70)
dW
dz
= @Wt+1
@z
+ @Wt
@z
+ @Wt
@^
@^
@z
  P
i=1;2
c0i
@Alevyit
@z
R 0 (71)
Proposition 15 The introduction of a levy-grant-scheme can be ambiguous
to welfare.
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Proof. If the total di¤erential were positive for z = 0, dW
dz
jz=0 > 0, the
introduction of the levy scheme would be welfare-improving. Equation (70)
consists of four terms. The rst term represents the discounted welfare gain
of training brought about by a subsidy. The second and third term depict
the welfare loss resulting from the levy in the training period. Both terms
are negative negative because @Wt
@z
< 0, @Wt
@^
< 0 and @^
@z
> 0. Lastly, the
fourth term states the marginal cost of additional training that is to be
deducted from welfare when training incentives are introduced. Without
specic functional forms, however, the total di¤erential cannot be signed.
The proposition essentially states that the welfare e¤ects from introducing
a levy scheme for apprenticeship training cannot be determined theoretically.
Whether this scheme would be benecial or detrimental to the economys
welfare critically depends on rmstraining with the subsidy and workers
changed labor supply. An empirical assessment of the training and labor
supply elasticities would therefore be required to determine net welfare.
4.4 Discussion
In the previous section it could be demonstrated that apprenticeship training
exhibits positive spillovers to other rms. Public policies addressing this
problem and increasing training e¤orts are therefore of interest. This section
analyzed various instruments introducing nancial incentives for vocational
training.
It was shown that an ideal Pigouvian subsidy could, at least in theory,
restore the social optimum. For this to be the case the subsidy should depend
on productivity levels in the economy. In reality, however, this information
may not be available. Thus, the use of a uniform subsidy may be required.
In comparison to the ideal Pigouvian scheme it will bring about additional
distortions. Because a uniform subsidy rate cannot account for di¤erences
between rms, such a training subsidy scheme may lead to undertraining
in some rms and overtraining in others. Nevertheless, it was pointed out
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that introducing a small uniform subsidy would be welfare-improving if non-
distortionary funding were available.
This section also investigated the widespread proposal of training levies.
It was unveiled that such schemes are a particular form of tax-subsidy-
systems. A tax is levied on employment and a subsidy is paid per apprentice-
ship. The analysis furthermore showed this tax, although paid by the rm,
to be fully shifted onto workers in the form of lower wages. This outcome,
however, can (partially) be attributed to the model. In reality, some shifting
onto consumers may occur if output markets are not perfectly competitive.
Whether the tax is fully shifted onto workers or only partially so, if labor
supply is elastic, the levy scheme will decrease labor supply and output. A
training levy thus brings about welfare gains from subsidizing apprenticeship
training while causing welfare losses from lower output due to reduced labor
supply. The net welfare e¤ect was shown to be theoretically ambiguous,
requiring an empirical estimation.
Nevertheless, this analysis requires some caution. So far, no adminis-
trative costs were taken into account. Yet, there are costs to administer,
monitor and verify the subsidy scheme, that arise both for the government
as well as the rms. In particular, non-negligible costs are associated with
the collection and distribution of funds or with the gathering and processing
of the necessary information. Including these costs would additionally reduce
welfare.
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5 Summary and Conclusions
The aim of this paper was threefold. Firstly, it sought to understand why
rms partially nance vocational education although it is mostly general
in nature and thereby of use to many rms. Secondly, it aimed to deter-
mine whether externalities arise from rms providing costly apprenticeship
training which would lead to socially ine¢ cient training. Thirdly, it was
asked whether incentive schemes, in particular levy-grant-schemes, would be
a welfare-improving policy.
Following recent developments in the training literature, a simple fric-
tional labor market model was introduced. In this setting, rms can be shown
to rationally provide apprenticeship training and partially incur some of its
costs although training is mostly general and workers are subject to poach-
ing by other rms. At the same time, however, it can also be demonstrated
that vocational training brings about positive spillovers on other rms. With
poachingtherefore causing an externality, apprenticeship training will fall
short of the socially optimal level. This raises interest for public policies
internalizing the externality and increasing training incentives.
At rst an ideal Pigouvian subsidy was analyzed as a reference case. In
principle, this scheme could restore the social optimum by providing the
training rm with a subsidy equal to the value of the positive spillover.
However, in order to calculate rm-specic subsidies, such an instrument
raises exceptional informational requirements. Alternatively, a uniform sub-
sidy could be set on average for all rms. Yet, as it does not distinguish
between rms, it could lead to under- and overtraining. Nevertheless, intro-
ducing a marginal uniform subsidy could be shown to be welfare-improving
if non-distortionary sources of funding were available.
Ultimately, the focus turned to analyze levy-grant-schemes which have
recently been proposed for Germany and which are in fact already exist-
ing in several industrialized countries. Such schemes were identied to be
a particular type of tax-subsidy-systems. E¤ectively, a tax is levied on em-
ployment and paid out per apprentice. The analysis revealed further that
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the tax burden of this instrument will be fully shifted onto workers. A levy-
grant-scheme for vocational education can therefore be characterized as a
pay-as-you-go-nancing of vocational education where present workers pay
for the vocational education of future workers.
Moreover, it could be pointed out that the introduction of a levy-grant-
scheme can be ambiguous to welfare. On the one hand, it provides additional
incentives for apprenticeship training and thereby increases welfare. On the
other hand, it reduces wages of the skilled workforce. Thus, labor supply will
shrink and thereby reduce production and welfare. Ultimately, net welfare
will depend on the size of both e¤ects.
What can be concluded from this exercise for the policy debate on in-
centive schemes for vocational training? Essentially, proponents and op-
ponents of a levy-grant-scheme are both somewhat right. Firms o¤ering
costly apprenticeship training providing mostly general training induce pos-
itive spillovers on other rms. Because not all returns accrue to the training
rm, this may indeed lead to under-provision of training. There could thus
in principle be a case for training policy to internalize the externality and
provide additional training incentives. A policy using the instrument of a
levy-grant-scheme may nevertheless not be warranted. It subsidizes socially
benecial apprenticeships but it also brings along economic distortions that
may actually exceed the benets from additional training.
From this analysis, what advise is to be given towards the proposal of
introducing a levy-grant-scheme for apprenticeship training in Germany? If
such an incentive scheme is indeed intended, less distortionary means of -
nancing and subsidizing should be sought. In principle, funding from general
tax receipts would be desirable, but given the state of the public budget at
present this seems not a feasible choice. When additional sources of nanc-
ing are therefore needed, a levy depending on payroll, i.e. rms total wage
bill, should be given preference over the present scheme proposal which refers
only to the number of employees. Otherwise, rms may strive to substitute
low-skilled workers for fewer high-skilled workers bringing along an additional
distortion from taxation.
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Overall, however, the case for a levy-grant-scheme must be considered
as rather weak. Apart from its informational demands, high administrative
costs are to be expected for government and rms as well. Moreover, this
scheme brings along signicant distortions arising from uniform subsidization
as well as from raising funds. Allowing apprentices and training rms to sign
reimbursement clauses seems an attractive alternative to provide increased
training incentives (Alewell & Richter 2001, 162). In perfect labor markets,
an agreement on reimbursing for training expenses essentially equals a train-
ing loan. By contrast, an analysis of reimbursement clauses within frictional
labor markets with monopsony power is lacking at present. This will be the
focus of another paper.
50
A Appendix
Proof of proposition (1)
Firmswage o¤ers vary with di¤erent valuations for skilled workers. Thus,
the problem arises whether the respective wage o¤ers allow both rms to
recruit skilled workers. This requires t+1 > 0 and also 1   t+1 > 0. Put
di¤erently, conditions v1;t+1 v2;t+1+3  0 and v2;t+1 v1;t+1+3  0 must
be met. Some rearranging of both inequalities gives
v1;t+1   v2;t+1   3 (72)
and
  (v1;t+1   v2;t+1)   3 () 3  v1;t+1   v2;t+1 (73)
One of these conditions will always be fullled. (The rm with the higher
labor productivity will always be able to acquire skilled workers from the
labor market because it can o¤er higher wages.) For the other condition to
hold (and also the second rm to recruit workers from the labor market)
the productivity di¤erence is not to exceed the threefold of the commuting
cost rate. We assume this to be the case because we wish to analyze the
duopson case. From straightforward inspection of (16), (17), (20), and (21)
using conditions (72) and (73) then directly follows proposition (1).
If both conditions were not met, the market for skilled labor would be a
monopson. Naturally, poaching cannot arise in a monopson. However, it is
a standard result that the monopson wage falls below the marginal product,
too.
Expected future net wage
The present value of a skilled workers future net income is represented by
the discounted expected net wage E ( ~wt+1) when working for rm 1 or 2.
E ( ~wt+1) =
Z ^t+1
0
 
w1;t+1   

d +
Z 1
^

t+1
 
w2;t+1    (1  )

d
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Dissolving the integral yields
E ( ~wt+1) =

w1;t+1  

2
2
^t+1
0
+

w2;t+1    +

2
2
1
^

t+1
or
E ( ~wt+1) = w

1;t+1^

t+1  

2
^
2
t+1 + w

2;t+1    +

2
  w2;t+1^

t+1 + ^

t+1  

2
^
2
t+1
which can be simplied to
E ( ~wt+1) =
 
w1;t+1   w2;t+1

^

t+1 + ^

t+1

1  ^t+1

+ w2;t+1  

2
Inserting for ^

t+1, w

1;t+1, w

2;t+1 and a couple of algebraic rearrangements
then yields
E ( ~wt+1) =
v1;t+1 + v2;t+1
2
+
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2
6
  5
4

Proof of proposition (5)
Firms return
Ri;f = Ri;t+1 = 
(vi;t+1   vj;t+1 + 3)2
18
@
@
:=
  (vi;t+1   vj;t+1)2 + 92
182
92 > (vi;t+1   vj;t+1)2
3 > (vi;t+1   vj;t+1)
@Ri;t+1
@
> 0
Workers share
Rw = E ( ~wt+1) =
v1;t+1 + v2;t+1
2
+
(v1;t+1   v2;t+1)2
6
  5
4

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@@
:=  6 (v1;t+1   v2;t+1)
2
6
  5
4
< 0
Private returns
Ri;priv = 

5vi;t+1 + vj;t+1
6
+
4
18
(vi;t+1   vj;t+1)2   3
4


@
@
:=  72 (vi;t+1   vj;t+1)
2
(18)2
  3
4
< 0
Derivation of equation (38)
Welfare in this economy consists of the prots and wages net of commuting
frictions.
Wt =
Z ^t
0
(v1t   w1t + w1t   )Ntd +
Z 1
^t
(v2t   w2t + w2t    (1  ))Ntd
Put simpler, welfare is net production.
Wt =
Z ^t
0
(v1t   )Ntd +
Z 1
^t
(v2t    (1  ))Ntd
By dissolving the integral
Wt = Nt

v1   
2
2
^t
0
+Nt

v2    + 
2
2
1
^t
obtain
Wt = Nt

v1^t   
2
^
2
t + v2    +

2
  v2^t + ^t   
2
^
2
t

which can be simplied to
Wt = Nt

v1^t   v2^t + ^t + v2   
2
  ^2t

Wt = Nt

^t

v1   v2 +    ^t

+ v2   
2

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Inserting for ^

t
Wt = Nt

v1   v2 + 3
6

v1   v2 +     v1   v2 + 3
6

+ v2   
2

Wt = Nt

v1   v2 + 3
6
 5v1   5v2 + 3
6
+ v2   
2

Wt = Nt

1
36
 
18v1   10v1v2 + 5v21 + 5v22 + 18v2   92

then yields
Wt = Nt

v1 + v2
2
+
5
36
(v1   v2)2   1
4


From
W =
X
t=1;2
t 1Wt  
X
i=1;2
ci (Ait)
then follows equation (38).
Proof of proposition (7)
In order to show that social returns to apprenticeship training exceed the
private returns, compare the condition for the social optimum (40)


v1 + v2
2
+
5
36
(v1   v2)2   1
4


  c0i (Ai) = 0 8i = f1; 2g
with the conditions for the private optimum (29) and (30)

(v1   v2 + 3)2
18
  c01 (A1) = 0
and

(v2   v1 + 3)2
18
  c01 (A1) = 0
Consider rst apprenticeship training at rm 1. Social returns to training
will be above private returns if
v1 + v2
2
+
5
36
(v1   v2)2   1
4
 >
(v1   v2 + 3)2
18
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This simplies to
 92 + 2v1 + 10v2 + (v1   v2)2 > 0
This condition essentially states combinations of , v1 and v2 for which train-
ing will cause a positive or negative externality to arise.
From above follows that both rms are in the market if conditions (72)
and (73) are fullled. Inserting for (v1   v2) we can rewrite to
 92 + 2v1 + 10v2 + 92 > 0
which then rearranges to
2v1 + 10v2 > 0
This condition is always fullled as long as commuting costs are positive.
Proceed likewise for apprenticeship training at rm 2.
v1 + v2
2
+
5
36
(v1   v2)2   1
4
 >
(v2   v1 + 3)2
18
which can be simplied to
10v1 + 2v2 + (v1   v2)2   92 > 0
Again inserting for (v1   v2) this condition is also respected.
10v1 + 2v2 > 0
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